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Egalitarian motives form a powerful force in pro-
moting prosocial behavior and enabling large-scale
cooperation in the human species [1]. At the neural
level, there is substantial, albeit correlational, evi-
dence suggesting a link between dopamine and
such behavior [2, 3]. However, important questions
remain about the specific role of dopamine in setting
ormodulating behavioral sensitivity to prosocial con-
cerns. Here, using a combination of pharmacological
tools and economic games, we provide critical evi-
dence for a causal involvement of dopamine in human
egalitarian tendencies. Specifically, using the brain
penetrant catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT) in-
hibitor tolcapone [4, 5], we investigated the causal
relationship between dopaminergic mechanisms
and two prosocial concerns at the core of a number
of widely used economic games: (1) the extent to
which individuals directly value the material payoffs
of others, i.e., generosity, and (2) the extent to which
they are averse to differences between their own
payoffs and those of others, i.e., inequity. We found
that dopaminergic augmentation via COMT inhibition
increased egalitarian tendencies in participants who
played an extended version of the dictator game
[6]. Strikingly, computational modeling of choice
behavior [7] revealed that tolcaponeexerted selective
effects on inequity aversion, and not on other compu-
tational components such as the extent towhich indi-
viduals directly value the material payoffs of others.
Together, thesedata shed light on the causal relation-
ship between neurochemical systems and human
prosocial behavior and have potential implications
for our understanding of the complex array of social
impairments accompanying neuropsychiatric disor-
ders involving dopaminergic dysregulation.
RESULTS
The presence of other-regarding preferences, such as aversion
to inequity and associated prosocial concerns, is widely thought912 Current Biology 25, 912–919, March 30, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltdto be instrumental to the development of large-scale cooperation
in the human species [8, 9]. At the neural level, there is now sub-
stantial computational and neuroimaging evidence connecting
such preferences to activity in brain regions known to receive
abundant dopaminergic projections, particularly frontostriatal
circuits [10, 11], in ways that are consistent with reward-encod-
ing and reinforcement properties of dopaminergic neurons
[12, 13]. However, despite these suggestions, as well as a wealth
of evidence demonstrating dopamine’s mechanistic involve-
ment in regulating social behavior in model organisms, we still
know little about the specific nature of dopamine’s involvement
in human prosocial behavior [14, 15].
Here, we addressed these questions using pharmacological
and computational tools to characterize dopaminergic contribu-
tions to an important class of prosocial behavior captured
by economic games [6]. Specifically, we investigated the causal
relationship between dopaminergic mechanisms and two proso-
cial concerns at the core of a number of widely used economic
games, including the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games: (1)
the extent to which individuals directly value the material payoffs
of others, i.e., generosity, and (2) the extent to which they are
averse to differences between their own payoffs and those of
others, i.e., inequity [6, 16].
To this end, we administered tolcapone to 35 healthy volun-
teers (mean age 32.5; SD 9.0) using a within-subject, random-
ized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, crossover design (see
Experimental Procedures). Tolcapone is a brain-penetrant drug
that enhances dopamine tone by acting as a competitive antag-
onist of catechol-O-methyl transferase (COMT), one of the
main enzymes responsible for dopamine catabolism and signal
termination [17]. In vivo microdialysis and voltammetry studies
have shown that when administered alone, tolcapone selectively
raises dopamine levels with little effect on norepinephrine and
other monoaminergic systems [18]. In particular, tolcapone is
thought to be differentially effective in augmenting dopamine
tone in brain regions with low levels of dopamine transporter
expression, especially the frontal cortex and hippocampus. In
these areas, the COMT enzyme represents a significant pathway
for dopamine signal termination by degradation [17, 19], in
contrast to regions such as the striatum where the presynaptic
dopamine transporter represents the dominant mode of dopa-
mine regulation [20].
Following administration of either tolcapone or placebo, each
subject participated in a continuous version of the dictator
game (DG) with an expanded choice space that allowed us toAll rights reserved
Figure 1. Experimental Paradigm
(A) Following double-blind administration of tolca-
pone or placebo, the subject in the position of
a dictator received an endowment of tokens and
unilaterally chose to give some portion to an
anonymous recipient. In each trial, the relative cost
and benefit of giving were manipulated by applying
separate self and other multiplier rates (rs, ro) to
convert tokens to payoffs for the subject and the
recipient, respectively. Generosity (blue), the extent
to which individuals directly value the material
payoffs of others, is operationalized as the amount
of money sent to the recipient, i.e., Mo = ro , To.
Inequity (red) is operationalized as the absolute
difference between self and other payoffs, i.e.,
jMs  Moj = jrs , Ts  ro , Toj.
(B) The relative value of kept and exchanged tokens
varied trial by trial. For example, under a 3:1 ex-
change rate, a token was worth $3 if kept by the
subject and $1 if given to the recipient (top). In
contrast, under the 1:3 exchange rate, a token was
worth only $1 if kept by the subject and $3 if given to
the recipient (bottom). Note that whereas the ineq-
uity in both cases is $2, thegenerosity is lower under
the 3:1 exchange rate than the 1:3 exchange rate.dissociate the behavioral effects of (1) inequity aversion and (2)
the direct value placed on others’ payoffs (i.e., generosity; see
also Supplemental Experimental Procedures) [21] (Figure 1;
Experimental Procedures). As in the standard DG [6], the partic-
ipant in the position of the dictator received an endowment con-
sisting of T tokens and could unilaterally choose to give some
portion To to an anonymous recipient while keeping the remain-
ing Ts tokens (Figure 1A). To dissociate the contributions of these
two quantities to prosocial behavior, we manipulated the relative
cost and benefit of giving in each trial by independently varying
howmuch each tokenwasworth to the dictator (rs) and the recip-
ient (ro) (Figure 1A). For example, under a 3:1 exchange rate, a
token could be worth $3 if kept by the subject and $1 if given
to the recipient. Under the 1:1 exchange rate, our task reduced
to the standard DG (Figure 1B).
We first examined the effects of exchange rate on baseline
prosocial behavior in the placebo condition. In each trial, we op-
erationalized generosity, the extent to which participants valued
payoff of others, to be the total amount of money Mo given to the
recipient, defined as the product of the number of tokens To
given to the recipient and the value of each token to the recipient
ro, i.e., Mo = To , ro. We further operationalized inequity as the
absolute difference between recipient and dictator payoffs, i.e.,
jMs  Moj = jro , To  rs , Tsj. Consistent with previous studies
[6, 21], we found that whereas amount given to the recipient
increased monotonically as cost of giving decreased, inequity
exhibited a U-shaped response (Figure 2A). Specifically, mean
amount given across all subjects was highest at the 1:3
exchange rate, for which the cost of giving was lowest and
the benefit to the recipient was highest ($81.54 ± $12.51 SEM).
In contrast, mean inequity was lowest at the 1:1 exchange
rate, when the cost of giving and the benefit to the recipient
were equal ($46.44 ± $9.21 SEM).
Importantly, how individuals respond to variation in the cost-
benefit ratio provides key insights into the relative impact of gen-
erosity and inequity aversion on choice behavior [6, 21]. BecauseCurrent Biology 25, 9inequity-averse individuals give more to others when their own
payoffs are greater (so-called advantageous inequity), but not
when others’ payoffs are greater (disadvantageous inequity),
they will allocate tokens in a way that equalizes the payoffs be-
tween the two players across all exchange rates. In contrast,
individuals who value payoff of others but are insensitive to ineq-
uity should increase giving when benefit to recipient is high, even
in the presence of disadvantageous inequity. Overall, we found
that the amount given to the recipient was not significantly asso-
ciated with payoff inequity at both the subject level (R2 = 0.059;
Figure 2B) and choice level (R2 = 0.0006; Figure S1).
We then used tolcapone to investigate how dopaminergic
manipulation causally impacts prosocial behavior at the level
of either inequity aversion or generosity. Current computational
accounts of behavioral and neuroimaging findings suggest
several possible mechanisms by which tolcapone might affect
prosocial behavior [2, 3, 12]. First, the involvement of dopami-
nergic regions in representing both social reward and self-
reward [12, 16] suggests that tolcapone may impact the weight
one places on others’ payoffs (or conversely, one’s own payoffs).
Alternatively, the fact that some of these regions also appear to
be sensitive to explicit measures of payoff inequity between par-
ticipants suggests that tolcapone administration may result in
selective changes in the weight participants attach to inequity
[2, 3, 12]. Finally, it is possible that this manipulation would affect
both or neither of these processes.
First, we found that tolcapone did not have a significant effect
on the amount given to the recipient ($48.03 ± $2.16 under
placebo versus $45.66 ± $1.91 under tolcapone, with a paired
difference of $2.64 ± $2.76, p = 0.34, paired random effects
t test; Figure 3A). This finding remained unchanged under a
cost-based operationalization of generosity (30.52 ± 3.28 tokens
under placebo versus 30.04 ± 3.32 tokens under tolcapone,
with a paired difference of 0.48 ± 1.51, p > 0.5, paired random
effects t test; see Figure S1). In contrast, tolcapone adminis-
tration resulted in a highly significant mean reduction in overall12–919, March 30, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 913
Figure 2. Dictator Game—Placebo Behav-
ioral Results
(A) Generosity, operationalized as amount of
money given to the anonymous recipient, and
inequity, operationalized as the absolute differ-
ence in self versus other payment, had different
dependencies on exchange rate. Amount given to
the recipient (gray bars) exhibited a monotonic
relationship with exchange rate, such that sub-
jects increased monetary allocation to the recip-
ient as the cost of sending money decreased. In
contrast, inequity wasminimal at the 1:1 exchange
rate and exhibited a U-shaped relationship with
respect to different exchange rates (black bars).
(B) Amount given and payoff inequity were disso-
ciable at the individual level. The scatterplot shows
the lack of correlation (R2 = 0.059, n.s.) between
average amount given and inequity across all
choices for every subject, under baseline (pla-
cebo) conditions.inequity—from $87.08 ± $3.45 in the placebo condition to
$80.16 ± $3.3 in the tolcapone condition—with a paired differ-
ence of $6.92 ± $2.43 (paired random effects t test, p < 0.01;
Figure 3A). Similar results were obtained using nonparametric
binomial tests, which are unaffected by variations in the size
of endowments across trials. Specifically, change in inequity
remained highly significant under the binomial test (p < 0.001),
and changes in the amount given to the recipient remained
non-significant (p > 0.1).
To more closely examine how tolcapone selectively affected
inequity, we separately examined mean changes in advanta-
geous anddisadvantageous inequity. To do so,we examinedpo-
tential changes in trials in which subjects incurred advantageous
and/or disadvantageous inequity across conditions (Figure 3B). If
tolcapone administration results in a general increase in behav-
ioral sensitivity to inequity, we would expect to see a decrease
in both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity. Consistent
with this hypothesis, we found that advantageous inequity
decreased from $128.36 ± $4.34 to $112.04 ± $4.44 (p < 0.01,
two-tailed t test), and disadvantageous inequity decreased
from $131 ± $8.27 to $74.99 ± $10.23 (p < 104, two-tailed t
test; Figure 3B). Importantly, this concomitant reduction in both
types of inequity, across all exchange rates (Figure S1), further
argues against the hypothesis that tolcapone directly increases
the reward value attached to the payoff of others, which would
instead predict a reduction in advantageous inequity and a
corresponding increase in disadvantageous inequity.
To explore the possibility that tolcapone administration
affected consistency of choices, we calculated a transitivity in-
dex to capture the degree to which participants’ choices violated
transitivity both on and off drug, where an index of 1 implies the
absence of intransitivity (see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). We found that participants’ choices were highly consis-
tent in both conditions (placebo: 0.97 ± 0.014 SEM; tolcapone:
0.98 ± 0.009), indicative of well-behaved preferences. Addition-
ally, there was no significant effect of tolcapone on choice con-
sistency (p > 0.1, paired t test; Figure S2).
Next, we examined how tolcapone effects in our task varied
at the individual level. Because tolcapone reduced both advan-
tageous and disadvantageous inequity, we compared mean914 Current Biology 25, 912–919, March 30, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltdinequity in individual subjects on tolcapone versus placebo.
We found that mean inequity in both the tolcapone and placebo
conditions was strongly correlated (R2 = 0.94, p < 1015) but that
tolcapone administration resulted in a modest yet systematic
increase in egalitarian behavior, reflected as a decrease in payoff
inequity, in our participants (Figures 3C and 3D; see Figure S2
for analysis of trial-by-trial inequity changes).
To assess the robustness of our results to potential confound-
ing variables such as order of drug and placebo administration,
gender, and BMI, we performed a repeated-measures ANOVA
including these measures, as well as their interactions with the
drug condition, as covariates of no interest. We found that
none of these factors exerted a significant influence on behavior
(p > 0.1 for all tests) and that the drug effect on inequity is robust
to their inclusion (p < 0.01; see Table S1). In addition, we
explored the extent to which observed individual differences
related to other moderating variables. In particular, previous
studies have suggested that the effects of dopaminergic drugs
may be related to baseline behavioral state, such that differential
effects might be observed depending on baseline inequity aver-
sion or on COMT genotype [22]. However, we did not find a sig-
nificant relationship between the mean inequity under placebo
and tolcapone-induced changes in inequity (Figure S2), and
these effects did not covary with COMT genotype (Figure S3
and Table S1).
Finally, we undertook a computational characterization of
choice behavior and formally connected tolcapone effects to
mathematical models that relate brain activity to putative internal
values underlying prosocial actions [2, 3, 12]. At the heart of
these models is the idea that humans perceive certain actions
as more or less rewarding depending on their effects not only
on one’s own economic interests but also on those of others
[6, 7, 12]. That is, prosocial preferences serve tomodify the value
of a subject’s own actions to account for his or her effect on other
people. Specifically, following widely used models of inequity
aversion [6, 7], we defined the subjective value function as:
UðMs; MoÞ=Ms  p,a,ðMs MoÞ  q,b,ðMo MsÞ;
where Ms and Mo refer to self and other payoff, respectively, and
p and q are indicator functions: p = 1 if MsRMo (advantageousAll rights reserved
Figure 3. Tolcapone Affects Behavioral
Sensitivity to Inequity, but Not Amount
Given to Recipient
(A) Overall effect of tolcapone. Amount given to the
recipient was unchanged between tolcapone and
placebo conditions ($48.03 ± $2.16 under placebo
versus $45.66 ± $1.91 under tolcapone; paired
difference = 2.64 ± 2.76, p = 0.34, paired random
effects t test), but there was a significant decrease
in inequity between subjects and their counter-
parts ($87.08 ± $3.45 under placebo to $80.16 ±
$3.3 under tolcapone; paired difference = $6.92 ±
$2.43, paired random effects t test, p < 0.01).
(B) Changes in inequity for trials in which subjects
incurred advantageous (i.e., self > other payoff,
gray) or disadvantageous (self < other payoff,
yellow) inequity. Reductions in both advantageous
and disadvantageous inequity contributed to the
overall decrease in inequity: advantageous ineq-
uity was reduced from $128.36 ± $4.34 under
placebo to $112.04 ± $4.44 under tolcapone (two-
tailed t test, p < 0.01), whereas disadvantageous
inequity changed from $131 ± $8.27 to
$74.99 ± $10.23 (two-tailed t test, p < 104; all
SEM). Neutral trials, defined as those in which no
inequity was observed under either placebo or
tolcapone, were excluded from this analysis. See
Figure S2 for similar results following inclusion of
neutral trials.
(C) Comparison of individual-level inequity under
tolcapone and placebo. Each point corresponds
to mean inequity of a single subject under placebo
(x axis) and tolcapone (y axis). Points on the di-
agonal represent subjects whose mean inequity
was identical between tolcapone and placebo
conditions. Points below the diagonal colored in
blue represent subjects for whom mean inequity decreased under tolcapone administration. Points above the diagonal colored in orange represent subjects for
whommean inequity increased under tolcapone administration.Mean inequity was highly stable across conditions (R2 = 0.94), suggesting that the behavioral trait
under study is highly robust. Nonetheless, inequity declined for themajority of subjects in the tolcapone condition (blue area), suggesting that the behavioral state
can be modified.
(D) Change in inequity across subjects. Each bar represents the total change in inequity (tolcaponeminus placebo) for each individual, averaged over all choices.
Most subjects experienced a reduction in inequity (blue bars) on tolcapone compared to baseline (placebo) behavior.inequity), and 0 otherwise; and q = 1, if Ms < Mo (disadvanta-
geous inequity), and 0 otherwise. Thus, a and b quantify concern
for inequity under advantageous and disadvantageous condi-
tions, respectively. Given choice behavior, the model was then
calibrated using a softmax specification with inverse tempera-
ture parameter l using maximum likelihood (see Experimental
Procedures).
Using this model, we first assessed the extent to which there
was an overall effect of tolcapone on preferences. Specifically,
we compared, at the individual level, the pairwise difference in
Akaike information criterion (AIC) between a model where a
and bwere allowed to vary across tolcapone and placebo versus
the null model where a and b did not vary. Consistent with our re-
sults above, we found that there was a significant reduction in
AIC (mean = 5.99, paired Wilcoxon test p < 0.05; permutation
test p < 0.001; see Figure S3), indicating that allowing a and b
to vary across conditions provided a significantly better fit to
the data.
Having assessed model fit, we next examined the extent to
which inequity preferences were affected by tolcapone adminis-
tration. Given our experimental design, a concomitant increaseCurrent Biology 25, 9or decrease in sensitivity to advantageous (a) and disadvanta-
geous (b) inequity would be consistent with an overall increase
or decrease in inequity aversion, respectively. Conversely,
changes in a and b of different signs would indicate an effect
on generosity. For example, an increase in sensitivity to advan-
tageous inequity but a decrease in sensitivity to disadvanta-
geous inequity would capture individuals who value others’
payoffs more under tolcapone, while the opposite would charac-
terize individuals who value others’ payoffs less. Consistent with
the model-free results above, we found that tolcapone signifi-
cantly increased a by 0.097 (from aplacebo = 0.39 to atolcapone =
0.49; bootstrap 95% confidence interval [CI] = (0.01, 0.21)) and
b by 0.17 (from bplacebo = 0.20 to btolcapone = 0.37; bootstrap
95% CI = (0.02, 0.34)). That is, subjects in the tolcapone
condition exhibited greater aversion to both advantageous and
disadvantageous inequity (Figure 4). Moreover, tolcapone did
not appear to exert a significantly greater effect on disadvanta-
geous inequity than on advantageous inequity (p > 0.1, paired
t test). In contrast, we did not find evidence for a change in the
inverse temperature parameter l under tolcapone (lplacebo =
0.025, ltolcapone = 0.027, paired t test p > 0.5).12–919, March 30, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 915
Figure 4. Computational Characterization of Prosocial Preferences
Tolcapone effects are captured by model parameter differences under tol-
capone or placebo, where a controls the sensitivity to advantageous inequity
and b controls the sensitivity to disadvantageous inequity. Quadrants corre-
spond to possible effects in terms of generosity and inequity: an increased
sensitivity to both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, captured by
positive changes in both a and b, reflects individuals with increased inequity
aversion under tolcapone, whereas a decreased sensitivity to both advanta-
geous and disadvantageous inequity, captured by negative changes in both a
and b, reflects individuals with decreased inequity aversion under tolcapone.
In contrast, an increased sensitivity to advantageous inequity but decreased
sensitivity to disadvantageous inequity captures individuals who became
more generous under tolcapone. Finally, the opposite indicates individuals
who became less generous. Tolcapone significantly increased sensitivity to
both advantageous (atolcapone  aplacebo = 0.097, paired difference 95% CI =
(0.01, 0.21)) and disadvantageous (btolcapone  bplacebo = 0.17, paired differ-
ence 95% CI = (0.02, 0.34)) inequity. The white circle identifies the maximum
likelihood estimate of the tolcapone effect, and smaller gray points represent
bootstrap pseudo-sample estimates (Experimental Procedures).DISCUSSION
The mechanistic involvement of dopaminergic systems in regu-
lating social behavior has been extensively studied in model or-
ganisms [23, 24]. Mesocorticolimbic dopamine, for example, has
been shown to be necessary in the establishment and mainte-
nance of social bonds in a number of species and is thought to
be an important biological pathway through which sex steroids
and neuropeptide hormones, including oxytocin, exert their ef-
fects on social behavior [25]. However, in contrast to more basic
perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral processes, a much greater
gap exists between animal studies built onmolecular and cellular
approaches on the one hand and human neuroimaging studies
on the other [12, 25, 26]. These differences relate not only to
the neural scale, but also to the complexities of the behaviors.
For example, unlike other species, human practices detail divi-
sion of labor and cooperation between genetically unrelated in-
dividuals in large groups [1, 27], and individuals regularly engage916 Current Biology 25, 912–919, March 30, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltdin costly rewarding and punishing of other individuals even in
cases in which there is no individual economic benefit [6, 16].
Here, by combining pharmacological tools with computational
modeling of an important class of social behavior captured by
economic games, we extend suggestions from previous studies
[13, 28] and demonstrate a key functional link between dopa-
mine and prosocial concerns that guide instrumental social
actions in humans. In particular, we found that enhancing dopa-
minergic tone via COMT inhibition is sufficient to increase ineq-
uity-averse behavior. That this effect occurred in the absence
of feedback about participants’ actions also supports the idea
that dopamine can influence valuation signals attached to proso-
cial actions, independent of its role in mediating the reinforcing
effects of social reward, and more specifically highlights the
role of dopamine in setting or modulating prosocial preferences.
Notably, we found that tolcapone appeared to exert similar
effects on individuals regardless of their initial attitude toward
inequity. The systematic changes under tolcapone observed in
our data suggest that inequity aversion appears to be a robust
trait-like phenotype, which likely reflects complex develop-
mental and genetic contributions, whose state can nonetheless
be causally affected via dopamine manipulation, further under-
scoring the importance of using a within-subject design in con-
trolling for individual variation in baseline behavior.
At the computational level, our results support current models
of prosocial behavior in which inequity is explicitly represented at
the neural level and separable from computations of reward
value for self and others [2, 3, 12]. Moreover, they are consistent
with two broad accounts previously proposed for the role of
dopamine in reward processing and goal-directed behavior
[29–32]. The first involves the possibility that different compo-
nents of dopamine responses carry distinct, behaviorally rele-
vant signals at multiple timescales. For example, in conditioning
tasks, substantial neurophysiological evidence indicates that, in
addition to fast phasic dopamine response to expected reward
on the order of tens of milliseconds, there exists a slower tonic
response to reward risk, defined as the expected variance of
reward, that can last up to several seconds [33].
This independent coding of risk is particularly interesting in our
case given the deep theoretical connection between decision-
making under uncertainty and the measurement of inequity
[34], based on the fact that both risk and inequity computations
require an estimate of the relevant distributions over outcome
probabilities or variation in earnings, respectively [2]. If tonic
dopamine firing responses to inequity behave in a similar manner
as those under risk, their influence on behavior could also be ex-
plained via the same mechanisms that have previously been
hypothesized for risk. Most directly, a tonic inequity signal could
be combined with phasic signals capturing the valuation for self
and other to drive inequity-averse behavior, analogous to the
combination of expected reward and reward variance to capture
behavior in risk-sensitive individuals [33, 35].
According to this view, inequity reduction under tolcapone de-
rives from the known effects of COMT inhibition on tonic dopa-
mine levels and, consequently, the balance between phasic
and tonic dopamine. Specifically, a tolcapone-mediated in-
crease in (cortical) tonic dopamine has been shown to increase
corticostriatal signaling via glutamatergic projections [36]. The
resulting increased stimulation of glutamate receptors locatedAll rights reserved
in presynaptic dopaminergic terminals is in turn known to
concomitantly increase tonic dopamine release in striatum [37]
and at the same time reduce phasic dopamine transmission
through activation of presynaptic D2 autoreceptors [36]. Under
such a mechanism, the blunting of phasic dopamine release in
striatum, combined with the increase in tonic dopaminergic
signaling, could allow the inequity signal encoded by the latter
to come to the forefront and drive inequity-averse behavior.
Alternatively, it is possible that the observed effects do not
involve a direct role of dopamine in the encoding of inequity
per se, but rather reflect its modulatory effects on brain struc-
tures involved in the assessment of inequity. In keeping with
this idea, previous neuroimaging studies have suggested that
inequity, as opposed to reward to either self or other, is corre-
lated with activity in cortical regions including the anterior insula
[38], which has been hypothesized to play a role in social norm
processing [39] and contains a high density of dopamine recep-
tors [40]. In contrast, primary and secondary reward to self and
others are known to strongly activate midbrain and ventral stria-
tal regions [41]. Consequently, if tolcapone selectively enhances
dopamine tone in the cortex [5], selective change in inequity
might be a product of strengthened cortical representations of
inequity or social norms [39].
Interestingly, both accounts are able to reconcile differences
between our findings and those of a previous study involving
L-DOPA administration, where it was suggested that L-DOPA
increased selfish behavior in a version of the DG [15]. In particular,
L-DOPA is known toenhancebothphasic and tonicdopaminergic
components by increasing the presynaptic availability of dopa-
mine [42], and this increase in phasic dopamine signaling could
exacerbate the relative importance of self-payoffs. In contrast, a
cortically driven tolcapone-induced increase in tonic signaling
and decrease in phasic signaling [36] could lead to very different
patterns of activity in striatum and cortex [36, 37] and potentially
to different weightings of self versus other preferences [14, 15].
Discriminating between the above accounts will require addi-
tional experiments that contrast the behavioral effects of tolca-
pone with those of pharmacological compounds that, unlike
L-DOPA, are known to exert dissociable effects on tonic and
phasic dopamine release. For example, the dopamine reuptake
inhibitor methylphenidate, like tolcapone, is thought to result in
an increase in tonic dopamine signaling but a reduction in
phasic responses [43]. Unlike tolcapone, however, whose direct
effects are thought to be in cortical areas [19], methylphenidate
is thought to act primarily in the striatum, where the dopamine
transporter is abundant [20]. Thus, methylphenidate should in-
crease inequity aversion in a similar manner as tolcapone if tonic
dopamine is responsible for carrying an ‘‘inequity signal,’’ but it
should not if the effect of tolcapone on inequity is primarily
mediated by modulation of cortical activity. Future experiments
using a combination of pharmacological and neuroimaging
studies will also be helpful in defining regional differences in
brain activity under these drugs. In complementary fashion,
novel techniques that directly measure sub-second dopamine
concentrations in the human brain could shed light on the rela-
tive contribution of tonic and phasic aspects of dopaminergic
signaling to behavior [44].
More broadly, our results highlight the potential of combining
pharmacological probes with formal quantitative frameworksCurrent Biology 25, 9for social behavior to address questions at themolecular and ge-
netic levels, the so-called ‘‘dark matter’’ of social neuroscience
[25]. Clinically, such an approach has important implications,
as the advancement of our understanding of the neurobiological
basis of social behavior represents an important step toward the
development of rational, mechanism-based treatments for dis-
orders involving social dysfunction. For example, dopaminergic
dysregulation, in particular affecting the prefrontal cortices,
is frequently accompanied by social impairments in disorders
such as schizophrenia and addiction [37]. However, whereas
disruptions in motor, memory, or emotional functioning are
readily recognized as symptoms of more serious underlying
conditions, social deficits are frequently overlooked and poorly
measured. Our results thus raise the possibility that assessing
these deficits quantitatively through a formal framework
combining computational modeling with game theoretic mea-
sures of behavior may continue to enable more focused hypoth-
eses about their etiology [25, 45].
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
A total of 35 (18 female) healthy subjects (i.e., without a history of neurological
or psychiatric illnesses) were eligible to participate. All subjects gave written
informed consent in accordance with the Committee for the Protection of
Human Subjects at the University of California, San Francisco and University
of California, Berkeley. Mean age was 32.5 ± 9.0 years; ethnicity was mixed,
including 23 Caucasian, 5 African American, 4 Hispanic, and 2 Asian partici-
pants, and 1 subject of mixed descent.
Procedure
During their first visit, subjects underwent a medical history and physical exam
as well as blood testing for liver function to ensure that there were no medical
contraindications to tolcapone use. Subsequently, subjects were randomized
in double-blind, counterbalanced, placebo-controlled fashion to either
placebo or a single 200-mg dose of tolcapone on their second visit and the
alternative treatment on their third visit. The pills were assigned a neutral label
(‘‘X’’ or ‘‘Y’’) so that neither the subject nor the experimenter was aware of the
identity of the drug being administered. At least 90min after pill ingestion, sub-
jects received task instructions and underwent a brief practice session before
performing the dictator task. Consistent with our other studies, subjects were
unable to distinguish between tolcapone and placebo (c2 test = 1.458, p > 0.2),
and tolcapone did not have noticeable side effects.
Behavioral Task
Subjects played a version of the DG. In the DG, subjects were asked to unilat-
erally decide the allocation of a monetary endowment between themselves
and a social partner who has no option to reciprocate. Payment was deter-
mined at the end of all sessions by randomly selecting one of the trials (see
Task Administration section in Supplemental Experimental Procedures.). In
our version of the DG, subjects received an endowment in the form of tokens,
which were converted to dollars using separate multipliers for kept and sent
tokens. In any given round, the self:other exchange rate was chosen from
one of five values: 3:1, 2:1, 1:1, 1:2, 1:3. When the rate was 1:3, for example,
a kept token was worth $1, but a sent token was worth $3. Behavioral results
indicate that subjects were sensitive to the exchange rate (Figure 2A). A linear
regression suggested that the difference between self and other payoffs would
be zero at a 1:2.3 exchange rate; in other words, overall subjects valued
equally $1 kept and $2.3 given. Links to the instructions, quiz, and choice
sheets are included in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Computational Modeling
T indicates the total number of tokens available and Ts and To indicate the
number of tokens allocated to self and other, respectively. Furthermore, rs
and ro indicate multiplier rates to self and other tokens, respectively, such12–919, March 30, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 917
that monetary payoffs to self and other are calculated as Ms = rs , Ts and
Mo = ro , To. We adopted a standard stochastic choice model in which choice
probabilities are determined by the subjective value function
UðMs;MoÞ=Ms  p,a,ðMs MoÞ  q,b,ðMo MsÞ;
where p and q are indicator functions, with p = 1 if Ms R Mo (advantageous
inequity), and p = 0 otherwise, and q = 1 if Ms <Mo (disadvantageous inequity),
and q = 0 otherwise. Thus, a and b quantify subjective aversion to inequity un-
der advantageous and disadvantageous conditions, respectively. Changes in
these scale factors can represent a range of well-established social prefer-
ences that includes generosity and inequity aversion. For example, an increase
in both a and b would mean that subjects became more sensitive to both
advantageous and disadvantageous inequity, indicating an increase in ineq-
uity aversion; conversely, a decrease in both parameters would indicate
a decrease in inequity aversion. If a decreased but b increased, subjects
became more sensitive to disadvantageous, but not advantageous, inequity,
resulting in a decrease in generosity. Finally, if a increased but b decreased,
the reverse was true, resulting in an increase in generosity. Given that partic-
ipants could allocate only a discrete number of tokens, the value function
can be rewritten as
UðTs;ToÞ= rs,Ts  p,a,ðrs,Ts  ro,ToÞ  q,b,ðro,To  rs,TsÞ;
which was calibrated to choice behavior by using a softmax specification with
inverse temperature parameter l, such that in each trial, the probability of the
participant choosing token allocation (Ts, To) is given by
PðTs;ToÞ= e
l,UðTs;ToÞP
j˛J
el,U

Tjs;T
j
o
;
where ðTjs;TjoÞ denotes the possible number of tokens that could be allocated
in the trial. We conducted maximal likelihood estimation by maximizing the log
likelihood function over individual participant i and trial t:
X
i
X
t
log

pi;t

Ts;To;aplacebo ; bplacebo ; atolcapone; btolcapone; l

:
The SEs of estimated parameters were obtained through a bootstrap proce-
dure with 200 iterations.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures,
three figures, and two tables and can be found with this article online at
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